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T
he aim of this article is twofold. First, to 
outline a general framework for the study of 
post-Soviet Ukraine that draws on my study of 
developments in different areas over the last decade. 
Ukraine became an independent state in January 
1992 with historical baggage from empire and 
totalitarianism. Of the 27 post-communist countries 
those with the lightest burdens of legacy from 
empire and totalitarianism have produced a more 
successful transition.1
This baggage has shaped a path dependency in a 
country divided into roughly three equal camps: active 
national democrats (often mistakenly referred to as 
“nationalists”) who form the basis of civil society, a 
passive center that draws upon those with an 
amorphous identity and former national communists 
turned oligarchs, and Ukraine’s largest political party, 
as well as an unreformed Communist Party of Ukraine 
(KPU). This path dependency and the resultant 
threefold division of political forces has produced a 
relatively stable environment in Ukraine, where none 
of these three political forces are able to dominate the 
country and impose their will. Breakthroughs in 
reform, along the lines of Central-Eastern Europe, 
were therefore impossible (and, by implication, so 
was a complete return to the past, as in neighboring 
Belarus). Domestic and foreign policies maintain 
Ukraine along a “muddling way” within a virtual 
polity where declared and actual policies are very 
different.2 Ukraine’s “muddle way” has meant that 
Ukraine has never outlined a concrete goal or 
domestic or international vision of what it is building
or where it is heading. Indeed, President Leonid 
Kuchma hoped that a Ukrainian scholarly conference 
in Summer 2001 would provide him with these 
answers, seven years after first being elected.
The national aspects of Ukraine’s path 
dependency have played the decisive role in 
determining two further outcomes? Ukraine’s 
inherited legacy within the national domain produced 
a country lying midway between denationalized 
Belarus and the highly nationally conscious three 
Baltic states. This has influenced such questions as 
support for current borders, the weakness of 
separatism, a close correlation between national 
identity and civil society and an amorphous 
“pragmatic center,” which acts as a buffer between 
national democrats and communists. Ukraine’s path 
dependency has helped to facilitate a delegative 
democracy where Russophones and Sovietophiles, 
who although living in the most populous regions of 
eastern and southern Ukraine, largely do not 
participate in civil society and whose main 
participation in the political process occurs only 
during elections. As a consequence of this political 
configuration, Ukraine’s elites can ignore national 
democrats during elections and Russophones and 
Sovietophiles between elections.
In this article I will survey this path dependency 
in two domestic areas to test the framework. These 
two areas are political and economic reform as well as 
state- and nation-building. Foreign and defense 
policies are referred to in the article within the context 
of domestic policies but to do them justice would 
require a separate article.3 4
1. See Alexander J.Motyl, “Ten Years After the Soviet Collapse: 
Persistence of the Past and Prospects for the Future,” in Adrian 
Karatnycky, A.Motyl and Amanda Schnetzer, eds., Nations in 
Transit 2001. Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East 
Central Europe and the Newly Independent States (New Brunswick, 
NJ and New York: Transaction Publishers and Freedom House, 
2001), 36-44.
2. See Dominique Arel, “Ukraine: The Muddle Way,” Current 
History, vol.97, no.620 (October 1998), 342-46, D. Arel, 
“Kuchmagate and the Demise of Ukraine's ‘Geopolitical Bluff” and 
Andrew Wilson, “Ukraine's New Virtual Politics,” East European 
Constitutional Review, vol. 10, nos. 2/3 (Spring/Summer 2001), 54- 
66.
3. See Philip G. Roeder, “Peoples and States after 1989: The 
Political Costs of Incomplete National Revolutions,” Slavic 
Review, vol.58, no.4 (Winter 1999), 854-81 and Taras Kuzio, 
“Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?” 
Politics, vol.21, no.3 (September 2001), 168-77.
4. See Jennifer Moroney, Taras Kuzio and Mikhail Molchanov, 
Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy (Westport: CT: Praeger, 
forthcoming 2002).0ther bibliographic sources on Ukrainian 
security policy can be found at:
www.taraskuzio.net/ukrainian/bibliography.html.
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Twin Legacies and Path Dependency
The legacies of empire and totalitarianism 
fundamentally affect the national question in 
Ukraine. Due to this legacy the national idea in 
Ukraine was strong enough to propel the country to 
independence but insufficiently powerful to become 
hegemonic in post-Soviet Ukraine. The national idea 
in Ukraine is influenced by these twin legacies in 
three areas.
First, the link between nationalism and 
modernization, which has always, as Ernest Gellner 
reminded us, been strong since the late eighteenth 
century and remains so in modernizing states in 
South East Asia today, was broken in eastern 
Ukraine. Until the 1920s nationalism and 
modernization were allowed to develop 
simultaneously in Soviet Ukraine because of the 
policies of indigenization and national communism. 
After Soviet leader Josef Stalin consolidated his 
power these twin policies were dropped in favor of a 
fusion of Soviet communism and Russian great 
power chauvinism that masqueraded as 
“internationalism.”
These policies lasted for five decades (from the 
mid 1930s to the mid 1980s), creating an urban and 
industrialized population with a territorial attachment 
to Soviet Ukraine and, in some cases to the USSR, 
but with few cultural or linguistic links to Ukrainian 
culture and language. Among this element of the 
population only two of the three political groups that 
dominate Ukrainian politics have been successful in 
winning their support—centrists (dominated by 
former national communists turned oligarchs) and 
the left.5
These legacies have influenced the inability of 
KPU (Communist Party of Ukraine) to evolve into a 
national communist or social-democratic, 
derzhavnyk, political party as elsewhere in Central- 
Eastern Europe. After the national communists 
(Leonid Kravchuk) and economic elites (Leonid 
Kuchma) of the KPU defected to the national 
democrats, the rump KPU remained disorganized 
and illegal. It was finally permitted to establish a 
new KPU in October 1993 that consisted of the hard-
line minority “imperial communists” from the pre- 
August 1991 KPU.
The KPU has always commanded a large number 
of seats in the Ukrainian Parliament, its only source 
of influence in Ukrainian politics, ranging from 80 in 
the 1994-1998 Rada to 120 in 1998-2002. The only 
occasion when they were absent from the Rada, due 
to their illegal status, was in 1992-1993. During this 
period the Rada under President Kravchuk and 
Prime Minister Kuchma could have ostensibly 
introduced radical reforms, but the fact that they did 
not is due to the reasons outlined in this framework. 
At that time the former national communists were 
even more unclear about any program of action or 
where they were taking the country (Kuchma asked 
the Rada this very question in despair), they had no 
political parties to represent their interests, the 
eastern Ukrainian wing of this establishment had 
still to decide whether it was financially worthwhile 
to be derzhavnyky and if they introduced reform 
policies which failed they would have had no KPU- 
dominated Rada on which to deflect blame.
Since 1994, when economic and political reforms 
began, Kuchma has constantly attacked the Rada for 
blocking his reform plans. This has been a 
commonly used excuse throughout the CIS and has 
been used by the executive as an argument to 
weaken parliamentary power at the expense of the 
presidency. Undoubtedly, the KPU has been a more 
vociferous critic of reform than the Communist 
parties of Central and Eastern Europe who, having 
become social democrats, have usually embraced 
reform (Serbia and Croatia, of course, until 2000 
represented exceptions). Nevertheless, by 
continually blaming others for Ukraine’s problems 
the executive follows the Soviet tradition of refusing 
to accept responsibility for problems that should be 
clearly laid at the feet of the head of state.
Freedom House’s Nations in Transit 2001 report 
clearly does not point to parliamentarianism as an 
obstacle to reform in Central Eastern Europe, where 
it is more prevalent.6 In the CIS, where 
presidentialism is prevalent, reform has not 
progressed faster but has regressed. The April 2000 
referendum organized by the executive to reduce the 
powers of the Rada by introducing a smaller number 
of deputies, two houses and removing immunity 
from deputies would have eroded Ukraine’s 
democratization even further. It was not 
implemented because “Kuchmagate” destroyed the
5. I discuss this legacy in my “Ukraine: Coming to Terms with the
Soviet Legacy,” The Journal of Communist Studies & Transition 
Politics, vol. 14, no.4 (December 1998), 1-27. 6. Available at www.freedomhouse.org.
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unity of the non-left majority in the Rada later that 
year.7
Democratization, the role of political parties and 
influence of civil society have regressed since the 
late 1990s in the CIS, including Ukraine,8 corruption 
and patronage have increased, and the independent 
media have come under attack. To blame the KPU 
for blocking reforms is, therefore, not to see the 
forest for the trees. By the end of the post-Soviet 
decade the former national communists-oligarchs 
had become the main threat to democratization in 
Ukraine, not the KPU. Those on the moderate left, 
such as Oleksandr Moroz and his Socialist Party 
(SPU), have supported the anti-oligarch-Kuchma 
opposition by accusing Kuchma of threatening both 
democratization and statehood.
This growing cleavage between the centrist 
oligarch camp and national democrats and their pro-
statehood left allies came abruptly onto the 
Ukrainian political scene in 2000-2001, when 
“Kuchmagate” exposed the true nature of the 
Kuchma regime. Ironically, the KPU refused to join 
the anti-Kuchma opposition and at times even 
supported the oligarch camp in the Rada, leading to 
accusations that they have been bought by the 
executive. This has broadened the rift between the 
anti-statehood KPU and the pro-statehood SPU.9
The second legacy is that national democrats, 
unlike their Baltic counterparts, have been unable to 
take power in Ukraine. Ironically, the Soviet regime 
strengthened an already powerfully entrenched 
national idea in western Ukraine, nurtured by the 
Austrian half of the Austro-Hungarian empire prior 
to 1918 (at a time when the Tsarist empire was doing 
its best to eradicate the Ukrainian national idea, 
including the single ban on any language in the 
empire, namely, Ukrainian). After the Jews were 
murdered and Poles ethnically cleansed the small 
number of urban centers in western Ukraine after 
1945 were filled with Ukrainians. Nationalism and 
modernization of the region went hand in hand as
7. See A. Karalnycky, “Meltdown in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, 
vol.80, no.3 (May-June 2001), 73-86.
8. S. Birch, “Nomenklatura Democratization: Parly Formation and 
Electoral Clientelism in Post-Soviet Ukraine,” Democratization, 
vol.4, no.4 (Winter 1997), pp.40-63 and Paul Kubicek, “The Limits 
of Electoral Democracy in Ukraine,” Democratization, vol.8, no.2 
(Summer 2001), 117-39.
9. See O. Haran and O. Majboroda, Ukraiinski Lvivi: Mizh
Leninizmom i Sotsial-Demokratieiu (Kyiv: Kyiv Mohyla Academy,
2000).
russification measures were relatively relaxed in 
comparison to those in western Belarus, also 
annexed from Poland.10
Ukrainians were not only the largest ethnic group 
proportionately among Soviet dissidents, but also a 
proportionately large number of them came from 
western Ukraine itself. Two-thirds of the parishes of 
the Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet era were 
to be found in Ukraine and three-quarters of these 
were in Galicia, reflecting a close link between 
nationalism and religion, higher than that found in 
Russia. With this historical legacy it is little wonder 
that western Ukraine led the nationalist movement 
against Soviet rule between 1988 and 1991 and 
today still dominates the anti-oligarch and anti- 
Kuchma camp which it accuses of having “hijacked” 
their successful push for sovereignty and 
monopolized and corrupted the derzhava.
This weakness of the national idea was 
celebrated by many Western scholars, policy makers 
and the media in the mid 1990s, because they feared 
that the “nationalizing policies” of what they 
negatively termed “nationalists” would lead to civil 
war between Russians and Ukrainians or 
Russophones and Ukrainophones.11 This view did 
not define nationalism in the broad sense of the term 
as able to lead to positive or negative outcomes, 
depending on the manner in which it was applied 
and defined. Ethnic conflict did indeed break out 
with the assistance of Russian covert operations in 
two post-Soviet states (Georgia and Azerbaijan), 
where national democrats came to power. In the 
three Baltic states, where national democrats also 
came to power, no ethnic conflict has taken place.
10. Roman Szporluk, “West Ukraine and West Belarussia: 
Historical Tradition, Social Communication, and Linguistic 
Assimilation,” Soviet Studies, vol.31, no.l (January 1979), 76-98.
11. See A. Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s. A 
Minority Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press, 1997), D. 
Arel, “Ukraine—The Temptation of the Nationalising State,” in V. 
Tismaneanu, ed., Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and 
the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 
157-88, and David Laitin, Identity in Formation. The Russian- 
Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998). For alternative views see T. Kuzio, 
Ukraine. State and Nation Building. (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998), T. Kuzio, “'Nationalising States or Nation 
Building: A Review of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical 
Evidence,” Nations and Nationalism, vol.7, part 2 (April 2001), 
135-54 and Eduard Ponarin, “The Prospects of Assimilation of the 
Russophone Populations in Estonia and Ukraine: A Reaction to 
David Laitin's Research,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 52, no.8 
(December 2000), 1535-41.
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There is no evidence to support the supposition that 
had national democrats come to power in Ukraine 
the country would have gone the Trans-Caucasian 
route rather than the Baltic one, particularly in the 
light of the lack of religious or ethnic hostility 
between Russians and Ukrainians.
In Central-Eastern Europe regimes changed as a 
consequence of “collective non-violent civic 
action...,” produced by mass movements 
campaigning on nationalist and democratic 
platforms.12 National democrats were only able to 
push Ukraine towards independence with the 
assistance of the national communists,' which meant 
that both sides had to compromise.13 The national 
communists, who were de-ideologized products of 
the Leonid Brezhnev era of stagnation, successfully 
transformed their political power into economic 
influence in the second half of the 1990s. Former 
Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko pointed out, 
“We had a clear political orientation prior to 
independence (when national democrats dominated 
the agenda) and none after independence (when 
former national communists-future oligarchs took 
over).”14
The mistake of Western scholars was always to 
assume that centrist oligarchs possessed any interest 
in national questions or that they were disinterested 
in state independence, in which they had a strong 
raison d’etre to legitimize their defection from the 
anti-independence KPU.15 Nation-building policies 
(historiography, symbols and, to a lesser extent, 
language and culture) were delegated to the national 
democrats, while they acted as border guards to 
ensure that policies in sensitive areas such as 
language remained evolutionary and thereby did not 
upset the Russophone constituency.16
12. A. Karatnycky, “Nations in Transit: Emerging Dynamics of 
Change,” in op cit., A.Karatnycky, A.Motyl and A.Schnetzer, 17.
13. Bohdan Nahaylo, The Ukrainian Resurgence (London: Hurst 
and Co, 1999) and T.Kuzio, Ukraine. Perestreoika to Independence, 
2d ed. (London and New York: Macmillan and St.Martin’s Press, 
2000).
14. Tserkalo Tyzhnia, 28 April-4 May 2001.
15. This point is made by P.D’Anieri, Economic Interdependence 
in Ukrainian-Russian Relations (New York: New York State 
University Press, 1999).
16. The leader of the United Social Democrats, Viktor Medvedchuk,
has openly talked of how his father’s links to the Ukrainian 
nationalist underground led to his family being deported to Siberia
in the 1940s, where he was bom.
The former national communists-oligarchs were 
willing to delegate these areas because they had 
nothing to offer in place of national symbols or 
Mykhailo Hrushevsky’s historiography. Soviet 
nationality policies had also instilled a commonly 
accepted view that “Ukraine” was the homeland of a 
titular nation—ethnic Ukrainians—and non- 
Ukrainians, who together comprised the civic nation. 
An independent state needed a “state language”; 
otherwise, it would go the way of de-nationalized 
Belarus. There was little opposition to learning or 
reviving one’s Ukrainian to become, or return to 
being, bilingual (the major criticism has not come 
from domestic groups but externally from Russia 
itself).
In turn, the national communists-oligarchs have 
been—and remain—distrustful of Russia, which 
was reinforced when Russia supported Sovietophile 
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka over Kuchma- 
type Trade Union leader and opposition leader 
Uladzimir Hancharyk in the September 2001 
elections.17 This has meant that they have agreed 
with their national democratic colleagues that 
Ukraine needs to maintain the CIS at a distance and 
use “strategic partnerships” with the U.S. and NATO 
to deflect Russian proposals for integration.
As Karatnycky has pointed out, how the 
communist system collapsed and what followed 
very much depended on the “strength of the national 
idea.” The fact that the national democrats could not 
take power because they were unpopular in eastern 
Ukraine has allowed the national communists to 
become oligarchs by preventing elite turnover and 
fundamental regime change. A history of past 
failures at achieving independence18 and the 
precariousness of national democratic support, 
which has averaged only between one-quarter and 
one-third of popular support, has led to a vocal 
constituency in both Ukraine and the Ukrainian 
diaspora who prioritize the derzhava, agreeing to 
keep reform on the back burner in the interests of 
state-building. Meanwhile, they turn a blind eye to 
corruption in order to “induce” the former Soviet 
Ukrainian elite to continue supporting statehood and
17. See T. Kuzio, “Identity and Nation-building in Ukraine: 
Defining the ‘Other,’” Ethnicities, vol.l, no.3 (December 2001), 
343-65.
18. In any one year Ukraine could celebrate three “independence 
days”: 22 January (1918), 30 June (1941) and 24 August (1991). 
The official holiday is the latter.
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not sign another Periaslav treaty with Russia.19 
Alternative arguments are made that corruption is no 
worse than in the Soviet era.20
The collection of policies promoted by the 
national democrats, which consisted of political and 
economic reform, de-sovietization and integration 
with Europe, and which are being successfully 
implemented in the three Baltic states, could not, 
therefore, be implemented in Ukraine. Instead, 
Ukraine went the “muddle way,” which was 
characterized by an unwillingness to break fully with 
the Soviet past or its geopolitical space and the 
perversion—but never negation—of the very terms 
“democratization” and “market economy.”
The third legacy in Ukraine was that upwards of 
one-third of the population lies outside either the 
KPU or the national democratic camps. They are 
likely to live outside western Ukraine and are maybe 
either Russophone or bilingual. Not supportive of the 
programmatic “package” offered by the national 
democrats, they have also been unwilling-despite a 
decade of socio-economic crisis-to support a return 
to the past and hence have not voted for the KPU.
Initially, genuine centrist political parties such as 
the Ukrainian Social Democrats attempted to gain 
support among this segment of the population. But, 
they failed and these genuine centrist parties then 
gradually moved into the national democratic and 
anti-oligarch-Kuchma camps. In their place 
“independents” have been traditionally elected in 
districts where Russophones and Sovietophiles 
predominate, while the KPU has been successful in 
wining seats on the party lists.21 “Independents” have 
created top-down centrist parties (e.g., Labor 
Ukraine and Regions of Ukraine), captured genuine 
centrist parties (the Greens, United Social Democrats 
and Peoples Democrats), defected from a left party
19. In 1654 Ukraine and Muscovy, as Russia was then called, signed 
the Periaslav Treaty which Russians and Soviet historiography and 
nationality policy proclaimed to be the “reunion” of two peoples but 
which Ukrainians see as leading to centuries of Russian rule and the 
loss of a ruling elite. See Serhii Plokhy, “The Ghosts of Pereyaslav: 
Russo-Ukrainian Historical Debates in the Post-Soviet Era,” Europe- 
Asia Studies, vol. 53., no. 3 (May 2001), 489-505.
20. Interview with Professor Roman Szporluk in The Ukrainian 
Weekly, 26 August 2001.
21. In the 1998 and 2002 parliamentary elections 50 percent of
deputies were elected in majoritarian districts and 50 percent on 
party lists. In the 1994 elections 100 percent of the seats were 
elected according to majoritarian principles. Party lists are preferred 
by ideological groups (the KPU and National Democrats) whereas 
the centrist oligarchs prefer majoritarian elections.
(the Peasants) to a new one (the Agrarians) or 
created a completely fake party after evolving from 
organized crime boss into presidential advisor 
(Oleksandr Volkov and his Democratic Union). Not 
surprisingly, these parties have little to do with what 
their titles claim (protection of the environment, 
defense of regions and labor or promoting 
democracy). They are regionally based (Agrarians in 
Galicia, Labor Ukraine in Dnipropetrovsk, Regions 
of Ukraine in Donetsk, United Social Democrats in 
Kyiv) and therefore usually represent regional 
“parties of power” (Labor Ukraine and Regions of 
Ukraine took over from Hromada and the Liberals as 
the “parties of power” with links to state patronage 
and “administrative resources” in Dnipropetrovsk 
and the Donbas).
More importantly, they represent the de- 
ideologized spectrum of Ukraine’s political groups. 
Only the national democrats and the left have 
concrete ideological programs that represent polar 
opposites-a complete break with the Soviet past 
through reform and integration with Europe and 
Trans-Atlantic (i.e., the EU and NATO) structures or 
a total return to the former USSR. The national 
democrats look to the Baltic states and Central- 
Eastern Europe, while the KPU looks to Belarus 
(KPU leader Petro Symonenko endorsed 
Lukashenko in the 2001 Belarusian elections).
The de-ideologized centrists lack any ideology 
and are unable to develop a vision for the country 
they lead because they are products of the Soviet 
past who cannot fully escape its twin legacies.22 
Therefore, they have positioned themselves midway 
between both of their ideological competitors 
through alliances with each side at different times. 
Yulia Tymoshenko, head of the anti-Kuchma Front 
for National Salvation (FNS) bloc, explained the 
lack of ideology and directionless state of Ukraine as 
follows:
Leonid Danylovych (Kuchma) simply acts 
without any kind of strategy. All his 
policies are based upon tactical 
manoeuvers. Kuchma continually moves 
from one dead end to another. At one 
moment he is convinced that an orientation 
towards Moscow is better. The vector of
22. See F.M.Rudych et al., Politychni Struktury ta Protsesy v 
Suchasniy Ukraiiny (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1995), 34, 36, 58, 63, 
112, 195.
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Ukraine’s (foreign) policy immediately 
turns towards the East. In a month 
everything changes. He turns to the 
West...23
“Pragmatic” domestic policies are promoted as a 
centrist alternative to “romantic” national 
democratic and restorationist KPU policies that are 
sometimes defined as a “third way” or the 
“Ukrainian way.” These seek to combine policies 
that do not completely reverse the Soviet legacy 
(e.g., in the language domain), while ensuring that 
non-transparent economic reform inordinately 
benefits the former Soviet Ukrainian ruling elite.
In the foreign policy arena this has manifested 
itself in a “multi-vector” foreign policy that is 
deliberately vague so as to be able to adapt to short-
term geopolitical changes. Because domestic policies 
in political and economic reform are insufficiently 
radical and overly corrupt to allow Ukraine’s 
integration into Europe, its declared foreign policy 
strategic goals remain impossible to fulfill. Ukraine 
is no longer portrayed as an anti-Russian “buffer” 
but as a “bridge” that links Eurasia and Europe. 
Although being a “buffer” has its drawbacks, it at 
least placed Kravchuk’s Ukraine firmly on one side 
of the divide within Europe, whereas a “bridge” 
situates Kuchma’s Ukraine with one foot in Europe 
and the other in Eurasia, constantly wavering 
between both poles.
Ukraine’s European partners constantly ask 
Ukraine’s leaders to demonstrate their “readiness” to 
promote its “European choice.” But this has proven 
to be impossible. Ukraine’s oligarchic centrists have 
close economic, and often corrupt, ties to Russia and 
the CIS, particularly through barter and the re-sale of 
energy. “Consequently, both economic and political 
interests of these groups are associated with Russia 
rather than the West.”24
This path dependency, which has been 
convenient for the centrists and Kuchma who have 
played off the KPU and national democrats, may be 
changing because of one personality, Viktor 
Yushchenko. Yushchenko, an eastern Ukrainian 
married to a Ukrainian-American, was prime 
minister for eighteen months, during which time he
was probably the first head of government who 
thought more about the country than enhancing or 
creating a personal fortune.25 Again, this logically 
followed from his patriotic, national democratic 
leanings. In thinking more about the country at large 
at a time of economic upturn he was able to pay 
salaries and pensions which had often gone unpaid 
for months at a time under his predecessors.
A non-corruptible prime minister has become 
Ukraine’s first ever popular politician. This has 
dispelled the notion that Ukrainians do not trust 
politicians and institutions because they do not 
support democratic politics. The real reason was far 
simpler and more telling. Until Yushchenko came on 
the scene Ukrainians believed that people only went 
into politics to enrich themselves and did not care 
about the welfare of the population at large. Seeing 
that this was not the case with Yushchenko, the 
population has given him extraordinarily high 
popularity ratings of 50-60 percent in a country 
where politicians regularly receive only single-digit 
figures. Although he has never hidden his links to 
national democratic parties, Yushchenko’s 
popularity ratings show that when the national 
democratic programmatic package is offered by a 
non-corrupt leader who is also interested in socio-
economic issues (and not only nation- and state-
building), then there will be support for him.
This phenomenon, therefore, threatens both the 
centrists, who can no longer claim to defend eastern 
Ukrainians from “nationalist” western Ukrainians, as 
well as the KPU, whose voters always represented a 
mix of hard-line nostalgic communists and those 
voting for the communists as a protest vote. 
(Opinion polls have constantly shown that 
Ukrainians would like to return to the certainties of 
the low prices and paid salaries of the Soviet era, 
while valuing the move away from totalitarianism 
towards democratization.)
Democratization and Economic 
Reform
Ukraine’s last decade can be divided into two 
halves. Whereas the first half saw progress in
23. Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 17 April 2001.
24. “Opportunities and Obstacles of the Road of Ukraine to NATO,”
Occasional Report 25 (August 2001), Center for Peace, Conversion 
and Foreign Policy of Ukraine.
25. The editor of Ukraine’s respected weekly, Tserkalo Tyzhnia (2-8 
June 2001), Yulia Mostovaya, sees employees in the Presidential 
Administration as only following “greed and discrediting materials 
against their rivals” with no interest in the fate of the state as a 
whole. The president meanwhile, is “completely directionless.”
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democratization, this regressed from 1997 onwards 
as the Kuchma regime entrenched itself in a stronger, 
corporatist state. Although two parliamentary 
elections in 1994 and 1998 and presidential elections 
in 1994 were largely pronounced to be “free and 
fair” by international observers, the 1999 presidential 
elections reflected the tendency towards democratic 
regression already evident in other areas.26 *This 
regression was also evident in the April 2000 
referendum, which was ignored by international 
organizations and has been pronounced as not having 
been conducted in a “free and fair” manner. The 
“Kuchmagate” tapes revealed the presence of 
widespread malpractice in the 1999 elections and the 
2000 referendum orchestrated by Kuchma.
Kuchma is in a dilemma over the 2002 
parliamentary elections, because he has been put on 
notice by the West who will be carefully monitoring 
them. Nonetheless, he is primarily concerned about 
his personal immunity from prosecution when his 
term in office ends in 2004. A large opposition 
presence in the Rada might lead to the launch of 
impeachment proceedings against him or, at the very 
least, an unwillingness to grant him immunity from 
prosecution after he leaves office.
The first half of the 1990s witnessed a growth in 
independent media, a solidification of civil society 
and political parties, and advances across a broad 
front of democratization. In 1996 and 1998 the 
Ukrainian and Crimean constitutions were adopted, 
which signaled the impossibility of going back to the 
Soviet era and an end to any debate as to the 
peninsula’s status. The adoption of the parliamentary 
variant of Ukraine’s constitution by the Rada 
represented a defeat for Kuchma who had always 
wanted to introduce a Russian-style presidential 
system. In 1998 Soviet passports also became illegal.
During the second half of the decade Ukraine 
evolved into an authoritarian, coiporatist state. 
Analyzing opposition to these trends we find that our 
framework correctly predicts that while the centrists 
largely supported the consolidation of corporatism 
the only groups to oppose the executive and support 
democratization and economic reform were-and 
remain-the very people that Western scholars have 
been quick to castigate as “nationalists,” namely, 
the national democrats.
26. Sarah Birch, Elections and Democratization in Ukraine
(London: Macmillan, 2000).
Moroz’s SPU, which supports the anti-Kuchma 
opposition on a platform of statehood and 
democracy, represents the only exception, whereas 
the KPU have remained suspiciously quiet. During 
the “Kuchmagate” crisis in Winter-Spring 2000- 
2001 it was the national democrats, emboldened by 
Yushchenko as Prime Minister, who demonstrated 
in support of democracy and created the first serious 
threat to Kuchma’s presidency. The national 
democrats were able to halt Kuchma’s plans to take 
Ukraine down the Belarusian-Central Asian 
authoritarian paths but were insufficiently strong to 
remove him in a national-democratic revolution , as 
in Serbia.
The second half of the decade witnessed a 
confusing picture. In the external policy domain 
Ukraine increasingly proclaimed its foreign policy 
goals as “returning to Europe,” especially under 
Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk from 1998 to 2000; 
Tarasiuk now stands in opposition to Kuchma and is 
allied with Yushchenko. In the domestic arena 
democratization regressed and economic reform 
stalled and stagnated. Domestic and foreign policies 
were clearly not coordinated. The Committee to 
Protect Journalists and Reporters without Frontiers 
condemned Ukraine’s repressive policies towards 
the independent media. The failure to this day to 
carry out a thorough investigation of the death of 
Georgii Gongadze, the journalist kidnapped in 
September 2000 and found murdered two months 
later, nearly led to the suspension of Ukraine’s 
membership in the Council of Europe in 2001.
The Security Service (SBU) under Leonid 
Derkach, whose son is a leading member of the 
Dnipropetrovsk-based Labor Ukraine oligarchic 
group, resurrected some of its old KGB activities 
(e.g., political surveillance of anti-regime opponents) 
together with the Tax Administration, and both 
institutions took part in corruption. It was during the 
late 1990s that SBU Major Melnychenko, who 
worked in counter-surveillance in the President’s 
office, witnessed these negative tendencies at first 
and utilized Soviet-era bugging equipment (the 
Presidential Administration is located in the building 
of the former Central Committee of the KPU) to 
transcribe 300 hours of taped conversations by 
Kuchma with his associates that revealed a wide 
range of illegal activities. Kuchma has never denied 
the authenticity of the tapes, but has claimed that 
different segments of his conversations were edited 
together to incriminate him. Melnychenko defected
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to the United States in April 2001 after living in 
hiding for six months in Europe.
In 1994 Kuchma came to power arguing that he 
would resolve the economic crisis that had worsened 
in Ukraine under his predecessor, especially after the 
hyper-inflation of 1993. A relatively radical and 
reformist program (Ukraine’s first) was launched in 
October 1994. Money flowed into Ukraine from 
international financial organizations after Ukraine 
agreed to surrender nuclear weapons, which it did in 
June 1996.
Kuchma’s reform program had mixed results. It 
succeeded in speeding up privatization but failed to 
lead to structural reform and the creation of more 
efficient enterprises. Monetary reform in 1996 led to 
the introduction of the new currency, the hryvnia, 
which has done relatively well, considering the state 
of the Ukrainian economy. Inflation was also 
brought under tighter control through monetary 
stabilization. Nevertheless, Kuchma’s promise of 
ending the economic crisis only occurred in 2000, 
when the economy began to grow for the first time in 
a decade. Whether this growth is sustainable with an 
oligarchic elite mainly interested in exporting 
capital, not investing, concerned with short-term 
profits and asset stripping is open to doubt.27
Corruption grew at an alarming rate—Ukraine 
was ranked 87"' out of 90 countries by Transparency 
International in its corruption league. Upon coming 
to power in 1994 Kuchma promised to reduce the 
size of the shadow economy but has failed. In 
January 2001 the Secretary of the National Security 
and Defense Council, Yevhen Marchuk, complained 
that it was still growing and that 52 percent of 
monetary transactions took place outside the banking 
system.
Legislation, committees and decrees failed to 
resolve Ukraine’s corruption problems. They 
resembled, like much else, mere declarations, not 
real policies. Charges of corruption against high- 
ranking officials were instigated only after these 
officials went over to the opposition. Pavlo 
Lazarenko was brought to Kyiv from Dnipropetrovsk 
and given two state medals by Kuchma during his 
year-long tenure as Prime Minister. After he created 
Hromada, his own anti-Kuchma political party, 
Lazarenko was threatened with arrest and in 1999
27. See Robert Kravchuk, Ukrainian Political Economy: The First 
Ten Years (New York: Palgrave/St. Martin's Press, forthcoming 
2002).
fled to the U.S., where he still resides under arrest, 
pending request for asylum. It is only common sense 
to assume that Kuchma and the SBU knew that 
Lazarenko was involved in corrupt activities but 
while he was their ally they did nothing against him.
His ally at the time, Tymoshenko, created 
Fatherland, a new anti-Kuchma party, on the ruins 
of Hromada and once she also joined the anti- 
Kuchma camp corruption charges were brought 
against her dating back to the mid 1990s with the 
help of the Russian “strategic partner”; she was 
arrested and then the charges were dropped. Her 
knowledge of the ways of corruption in the energy 
sector was the reason Yushchenko appointed her to 
be Deputy Prime Minister in 2000. She drastically 
reduced funds diverted to the oligarchs and 
increased the state budget, thereby ensuring that 
salaries and pensions could be paid. These funds 
were being diverted at the expense of Ukrainian 
citizens’ salaries and pensions by pre-Yushchenko 
Prime Ministers, with the knowledge of the 
executive and other state bodies. Not only did the 
process lead to capital accumulation by oligarchs 
and Kuchma, but it also suppressed civil society 
because the primary concern of Ukrainians became 
survival, not politics.
State, Nation-building and Religion
Over the last decade of independence Ukrainian 
elites have reached a consensus about nation-
building in regard to six areas: state- and institution-
building, borders and territorial integrity, civic 
(state) nationalism, language, national minorities and 
historiography. Consensus at the mass level is still 
far from secured. Scholars have dubbed this 
consensus the Ukrainian consociational nation-
building model, or, a creole amalgam of 
Ukrainophone-Russophone identities.28
State- and Institution-Building
Two of the three political forces in Ukraine, the 
oligarchic centrists and national democrats, support 
state- and institution-building, but the camps differ 
as to how the state should function. As the
28. See Arunas Juska, “Ethno-political Transformation in the States 
of the Former USSR,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.22, no.3 (May 
1999), 524-53 and Mykola Riabchuk, “Behind the Talks on 
‘Ukrainianization’: Laissez Faire or Affirmative Action?” in Theofil 
Kis and Iryna Makaryk, eds., Towards a New Ukraine II (Ottawa: 
University of Ottawa, 2001), 135-142.
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“Kuchmagate” tapes have shown, the centrists prefer 
a non-transparent corporatist virtual state, where 
what is said is often different to what is undertaken, 
a feature reminiscent of elements of the Soviet past.29 
In contrast, the national democrats look to reforms 
that would introduce transparency, accountability 
and the rule of law.
The KPU would not accept the transformation of 
Ukraine into a gubernia within the Russian 
Federation.30 Ironically, their wish to support both 
sovereignty and a new union is similar to the 
confederation of Soviet sovereign states that national 
communists in Ukraine supported prior to 24 August 
1991. This reflects their own evolution during the 
last decade towards a Soviet Ukrainian territorial 
nationalism.
Borders and Territorial Integrity
Votes in the Rada in response to either territorial 
claims on the Crimea or against separatist tendencies 
by Crimean leaders have always been passed by 
more than two-thirds of deputies (i.e., a 
constitutional majority), which is rare in Ukrainian 
parliamentary politics. All of Ukraine’s leaders have 
always adopted a tough, non-violent line on Crimea.
Despite the volumes written on the subject by 
Western scholars and journalists, separatism has not 
manifested itself in eastern Ukraine in any manner 
whatsoever (including elections) and Russian ethnic 
nationalists have been unable to find fertile ground 
for support. In Crimea, separatism existed for a brief 
period, but rapidly disintegrated after 1995. The 
largest party on the peninsula, the communists, have 
always backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and 
were instrumental in adopting the non-separatist 
Crimean constitution in October 1998 (ratified by the 
Rada in December of that year).
After the adoption of the June 1996 Ukrainian 
Constitution, Crimean regional parties had to re-
register as either all-Ukrainian parties or as regional 
branches of existing Ukrainian parties. Support for 
separatism was further undercut after the Russian 
executive recognized Ukraine’s borders in May 
1997, a recognition ratified by the lower and upper
houses of the Russian Parliament in December 1998 
and February 1999 respectively.
Civic (State) Nationalism3’
Ukrainian independence was achieved and 
consolidated through a combination of pressure from 
the bottom up by national democrats and top down 
by national communists that continued as an alliance 
against the third camp, the KPU, who opposed 
statehood. This alliance continued until November 
2000, when “Kuchmagate” irrevocably produced a 
gulf between the oligarchic centrists and national 
democrats. Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc attempts 
to bridge this gulf by being anti-oligarch but pro- 
Kuchma, positioning itself midway between 
Tymoshenko’s radical anti-Kuchma FNS and the 
oligarchs.
Since 1992 civic nationalism has evolved into a 
widespread phenomenon throughout Ukraine’s 
elites. This has occurred through the spread of the 
national idea from national democrats to the 
oligarchic centrists (where many of the former 
national communists, such as Kravchuk and 
Kuchma, ended up) and then gradually into the 
moderate left (for example, the SPU) political 
spectrum. Civic (or state) nationalist ideology is 
common to the ruling elites of all civic states, 
including Ukraine, and therefore to argue that 
nationalism is a “minority faith” in Ukraine reflects 
a lack of understanding of “banal nationalism” and 
its pervasive and central role in the modern nation- 
state.32 Ukraine’s elites have not rejected 
independence, unlike in Belarus, and coupled with 
the fact that public support for independence has 
never dropped during the last decade below two- 
thirds implies that nationalism is a “majority faith” 
in Ukraine.
Under Kuchma, the nation-building project was 
not halted, as it was under President Lukashenka in 
Belarus after 1994. Ukraine’s nation-building project 
seeks to strike a balance between the Baltic nation-
building and Belarusian nation-rejecting paths. This 
centrist path between two polar opposite projects 
thereby leads to dissatisfaction on the part of both 
national democrats (who support a more radical
29. See P. Kubicek, Unbroken Ties. The Shite, Interest Associations, 
and Corporatism in Post-Soviet Ukraine (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2000).
30. Jan Urban, “The Communist Parties of Russia and Ukraine on 
the Eve of the 1999 Election: Similarities, Contrasts and 
Interaction,”Democratization, vol.7, no.l (1998), 111-34.
31. See T. Kuzio, “Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards a New 
Theoretical and Comparative Framework,” Journal of Political 
Ideologies (forthcoming, 2002).
32. Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London and Thousand Oaks: 
Sage Publications, 1995).
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state- and nation-building project) and pro-Russian 
forces (who support the maintenance of the inherited 
post-colonial status quo). The more abrasive 
nationality policies of the Kravchuk era were 
“pragmatized” (i.e., moderated) in the Kuchma era, 
because Russophone Ukrainians would not accept a 
radical and swift nation-building project.
Language
The language question did not influence the 
outcome of either the 1998 parliamentary or 1999 
presidential elections. There is declining support for 
Russian to become a second state language (with 
virtually no support, again except on the extreme 
left, for Russians to be a second titular nation). The 
Russian language has been removed from education 
and public life in western Ukraine, where nationality 
policies resemble those implemented in the three 
Baltic states. Elsewhere in Ukraine the Russian 
language has not become “foreign.” Ukrainianization 
of the education system has continued under 
Kuchma and spread to most regions, except the 
Donbas and Crimea.33 The proportion of school 
children instructed in Ukrainian rose from 47.9 
percent in school year 1990-91 to 62.8 percent in 
1997-98. Meanwhile, the proportion of pupils 
instructed in Russian declined from 51.4 to 31.7 
percent. In pre-schools, 25.3 percent of children are 
taught in Russian and in higher education 35 per cent 
of students are taught in Russian.34 In higher 
education the proportion of students instructed in 
Ukrainian rose from 36.8 percent (1992-93) to 51.2 
percent (1995-96).35
Reflecting the legacies of Soviet nationality 
policies referred to earlier, the Ukrainian authorities 
continue to uphold the view that the proportion of
33. See Viktor Stepanenko, The Construction of Identity and School 
Policy in Ukraine (Commack, N.Y. : Nova Science Publishers,
1999) .
34. Figures provided by Yuriy Bohuts’kyi of the Presidential 
Administration (“Russia Afraid of Ukraine’s De-Russification,” 
RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, Ukraine Report, 15 February 2000). 1,195 
Russian-language newspapers are published in Ukraine, the 
Ukrainian Foreign Ministry pointed out, in comparison to none in 
Ukrainian for the second largest national minority of the Russian 
Federation, Ukrainians. See “Russian Language in Ukraine: 
Surrealistic Notes,” Research Update, Ukrainian Center for 
Independent Political Research, Kyiv, vol.6, no. 161 (21 February
2000) .
35. J. G. Janmaat, “Language Politics in Education and the Response
of the Russians in Ukraine,” Nationalities Papers, vol.. 27, no.3
(September 1999), 475 and 478.
pupils educated in a language should approximate 
the proportion of the corresponding ethnic group 
within the population.36 * In December 1999 the 
Constitutional Court issued a ruling that explained 
the language provisions of the 1996 Constitution 
(such as state administrators using Ukrainian) as 
applying throughout Ukrainian territory. In January 
2000 the Ukrainian Presidential Council on 
Language Policy Issues approved the government 
program “On Additional Measures to Expand the 
Use of Ukrainian as the State Language,” which 
came into effect in June of that year. It called for all 
officials to be tested for their Ukrainian language 
proficiency, for the de-Russification of the sports 
and cultural spheres and for the use of taxation to 
regulate the import of publications. In the post- 
Yushchenko era these policies are likely to be 
watered down.
Ukrainian elites have reached agreement that an 
independent state needs a state language as an 
attribute of identity, pointing to Belarus as an 
example of a country which lost its independence 
because of a weak national consciousness. Outside 
of western Ukraine, where Ukrainian is hegemonic, 
and the Donbas and the Crimea, where Russian 
remains dominant, bilingualism is growing as 
affirmative action in education and state institutions 
legitimizes and rehabilitates Ukrainian as a modern 
language.
National Minorities
Elite consensus was always in favor of the 
provision of polyethnic rights and inclusive 
citizenship, which has been backed by all political 
parties, other than the extreme right. National 
democrats have always backed the national revival 
of minorities, since their dispute was always with 
Russians who never saw themselves as a national 
minority but as a second ruling titular nation.
The Russian question is made all the more 
difficult by the fact that not all of the 12 million 
declared “Russians” from the 1989 Soviet census are 
really “ethnic Russians”; upwards of half of these 
may re-identify themselves as “Ukrainians.”
36. Vasyl’ Kremen’, Dmytro Tabachnyk and Vasyl’ Tkachenko, 
Ukraiina. Alternatyvypostupu. Krytyka istorychnoho dosvidu (Kyiv: 
Arc-Ukraine, 1996), 756-57. The January 2000 program “On 
Additional Measures to Expand the Use of Ukrainian as the State 
Language” proposes, “bringing the system of educational 
institutions into line with the ethnic composition of the population” 
(RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, Ukraine Report, 15 February 2000).
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“Russians” in the 1989 Soviet census included not 
only ethnic Russians but also those from mixed 
marriages. “Russians” also represented a 
supranational term that included those who identified 
with the USSR (the Russian homeland was defined 
as the USSR, not the Russian SFSR, unlike in the 
non-Russian republics where two homelands 
competed for allegiances, the republics and the 
USSR).
During the mid 1990s the majority Western 
scholarly view held that Ukraine was divided into 
two antagonistic linguistic groups with different 
geopolitical orientations. Similarly, many works 
studied the Russian “diaspora” as if it were one 
united group with an allegiance to the Russian 
Federation. In reality, few had any allegiance to 
Russia and if they did it was to the non-existent 
USSR. Separatism toward Russia in eastern Ukraine 
has never manifested itself.
By the late 1990s this view was being criticized 
by a growing number of scholars for over- 
essentializing those who identified themselves as 
“Russians,” “Ukrainians” or others in the 1989 
Soviet census.37 The tendency within Western 
political science to categorize people into one group 
or another ignores the confused reality on the 
ground, particularly in a country that follows the 
“muddle way” like Ukraine. People have different 
identities that change over time and that re-prioritize 
themselves. The number of those defining 
themselves with a Soviet identity, for example, has 
declined in the Donbas during the last decade.
By categorizing Ukrainians into only two 
linguistic groups scholars claimed that Russophones 
were the largest linguistic group in Ukraine. But, this 
could only be undertaken by ignoring the fact that a 
large number of Ukrainians use both languages 
equally. If this bilingual group is taken into account, 
Russophones are the smallest of the three linguistic 
groups. This emphasis on linguistic groups also 
failed to take into account that there has never been 
any evidence of a unified Russophone community in 
Ukraine. Such a group would have to unite very 
different regional cultures spanning the Donbas, 
Odesa, Kyiv and western Ukraine.
Barrington found that attachment to a 
Russophone identity was weak in Ukraine (13 
percent) and far less popular than that for ethnicity
37. Rasma Karklins, “The Misunderstanding of Ethnicity,” Problems 
of Post-Communism, vol.. 48, no.3 (May-June 2001), 37-44.
(34 percent) and citizenship (57 percent). Russian- 
speaking Ukrainians were closer to their Ukrainian-
speaking counterparts on questions such as 
Ukrainian statehood and the small number who 
identified as Russophones. They did not constitute a 
threat to the state, because no Russophone 
conglomerate exists; mobilization along Russian 
nationalist, separatist or autonomy seeking lines has 
not occurred. More importantly, talk by some 
scholars of “linguistic faultlines” and of the 
consolidation of Ukraine into two linguistic groups 
along the lines of Belgium is not occurring.38 
Historiography
Despite concerns by some scholars that a 
“nationalist historiography” (i.e., the Hrushevs’kyi 
schema) would not be accepted by Russophones,39 
this has not materialized into conflict. The only 
criticism against current historiography has come 
from the KPU, not centrists. Janmaat and Popson 
have shown to what extent the same historiography 
is taught throughout Ukraine’s educational system, 
regardless of what language is predominately spoken 
in which region, including in the Crimea.40 41All 
shades of political opinion, except the KPU, support 
the revival of the Hrushevs’kyi historiographical 
framework. Wanner’s volume was the first in 
contemporary Ukrainian studies that sought to place 
nation-building and historiography within an 
anthropological framework that does not see 
historiography, myths and legends as unusual, but 
as commonplace policies adopted within all civic 
states.
38. Lowell Barrington, “Russian-Speakers in Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan: ‘Nationality,’ ‘Population,’ or Neither?” Post-Soviet 
Affairs, vol..17, no.2 (April-June 2001), 129-58.
39. A. Wilson, “Myths of National History in Belarus and Ukraine,” 
in Geoffrey Hosking and George Schopflin, eds., Myths & 
Nationhood (London: Hurst, 1997), 182-97.
40. Germ Janmaat, Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine. 
Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking 
Population (Amsterdam: Netherlands Geographical Studies, 2000) 
and Nancy Popson, “The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing 
Children to the ‘Ukrainian Nation,’” Nationalities Papers, vol..29, 
no.2 (June 2001), 325-50. See my criticism of the continued 
dominance of Russophile historiography in “History and National 
Identity Among the Eastern Slavs. Towards a New Framework,” 
National Identities, vol. 3, no. 2 (July 2001), 109-32.
41. Catherine Wanner, Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in 
Post-Soviet Ukraine. Post-Communist Cultural Studies 
(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998).
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Conclusion
Ukraine’s politics are confusing because they are 
neither fully reformist nor Soviet restorationist; they 
are unable to make a break with or effect a return to 
the Soviet past.
These muddled domestic policies undermine the 
declared strategic foreign policy goals of “returning 
to Europe,” while keeping the country as a bridge 
spanning Europe and Eurasia. Muddled domestic 
policies lead to equally muddled “multi-vector” 
foreign policies that cannot decide if Ukraine is part 
of Eurasia or Europe. Some elements of the elite 
believe that the only way to deal with this question is 
to make Ukraine’s foreign policy even more 
confusing by declaring that it will rejoin Europe only 
with Russia, a policy for never rejoining Europe.
The twin legacies of empire and totalitarianism 
have guided this path dependency during the last 
decade along a “muddle way.” This “muddle way” 
by its very nature is unstable, as it cannot resolve 
medium- or long-term problems, provide goals or 
visions, and is only premised on a narrow corporatist 
elite participating in the fruits of independence. The 
muddle way is therefore only a short-term attempt at 
outlining some elements of policy.
Growing ties to Europe, the successful transition 
examples of Central-Eastern Europe, and domestic 
transformations that will eventually lead to a more 
emboldened civil society, a more active youth and a 
middle class with a stake in private enterprise and 
private property suggests that-as in Latin 
America-the “muddle way” can be changed over 
time. Latin American and Iberian corporatism has 
evolved into democratic and market economies since 
the 1970s.
How, when and at what speed Ukraine moves 
away from its muddled path and its authoritarian 
corporatism, depends upon a factor that has been 
usually castigated by Western scholars of 
contemporary Ukraine. The choice open to post- 
Soviet states is a return to the Soviet past, as in 
Belarus by a Sovietophile regime; continue muddling 
along as in Ukraine’s first decade with oligarchs 
unclear as to where they are taking the country; or, 
following clear policies that combine civic 
nationalism and reform as in the three Baltic states. 
Yet, ironically, the first decade of Ukraine’s 
independence has shown that there was too 
little—not too much—nationalism in Ukraine, as
understood in its civic and patriotic variant.42 The 
only alternative to short-term, muddled policies that 
benefit a small oligarchic elite is a civic nationalism 
(or patriotism for those who prefer that term) that 
espouses relatively radical reform that can break 
with the Soviet past, takes the interests of the 
country to heart (and not elite clans), while driving 
the country forward domestically and externally. 
Greater civic nationalism (patriotism) would ensure 
that Ukraine’s second decade as an independent state 
would not be as muddled as its first.
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